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Recently there has been renewed interest in production complementarity and
coordination failure in Macroeconomics. Indeed, Evans, Honkapohja, and Romer [1998,
506] identify production complementarity as the only plausible mechanism for gener-
ating macroeconomic coordination failure. Colander [1996] and Cooper [1999] provide
excellent overviews and Romer [1996, 294-299] an excellent brief summary. The par-
ticular concern of this coordination approach is with models of multiple Pareto ranked
equilibria, where production complementarity induces the multiplicity of equilibria. A
“coordination failure” is the realization of such a Pareto dominated equilibrium. The
realization of such an equilibrium is “bad” in an unambiguous sense; that is, the economy
is, in this circumstance, unambiguously malfunctioning. Thus the existence of such
coordination failures provides a reasonable explanation of how macroeconomic prob-
lems can come into existence, even as all agents are rational.
If production complementarity is the mechanism for generating macroeconomic
coordination failure generally, then it should be the mechanism for generating a promi-
nent feature of macroeconomic coordination failure, monetary fragility. This paper
draws the link between production complementarity, coordination failure and mon-
etary fragility, by exploiting standard, archetypal production complementarities. Thus
the paper describes a simple and stylized environment in which the two basic produc-
tion complementarities identified by Cooper [1999, 41-45] generate macroeconomic
coordination failure and monetary fragility.
The first of these basic production complementarities is between the suppliers of
inputs to a final product fabricator. This is the archetypal “input game,” with an “inter-
nal constant returns to scale production process,” in Cooper’s terms. In this input
game a fabricator needs to coordinate her suppliers of complementary inputs. It is the
interaction between fabricator and suppliers, in this input coordination game, which
induces a role for money.  Further, the threat of coordination failure induces a de-
mand for high-powered money.98 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
PRODUCTION COMPLEMENTARITIES, COORDINATION, AND
FRAGILITY
Production complementarity induces fragility. There is a basic standard parable of
production complementarity.  In this parable, there are N > 1 individuals whose inputs
ei, “effort,” jointly determine output. In particular, the payoff to effort for each indi-
vidual i is a[min(e1,...,eN)]   bei, where a > b > 0 and ei[0,1].  a[min(e1,...,eN)] is the
utility gain to the individual from the joint output, and  bei is the utility loss to the
individual from her (own) effort. The individuals choose their effort levels indepen-
dently. This game has a continuum of Pareto ranked Nash equilibria, where ei are
equal for all i.1 This is illustrated in Figure 1, where the bold line represents indi-
vidual i’s payoff, when the minimum effort of the other individuals is ei.
FIGURE 1
A fortiori, such multiple equilibria are a concern in the slightly more complicated
version of this parable developed in this paper. One approach game theory takes to
multiple equilibria is to select particularly salient equilibria.  Specifically, where they
exist, Pareto dominant and secure equilibria are selected [Cooper, 1999]. The above
basic parable of decentralized production has both. Namely, ei= 1, for all i, is Pareto
dominant, indeed Pareto optimal. On the other hand, ei=0, for all i, is the secure
equilibrium. That is, ei= 0 maximizes the player’s payoff, given that she believes that
the others will choose the strategy that minimizes her payoff, namely zero effort on




















Secondly, there is a general production complementarity between the fabricators
themselves, “external returns” in Cooper’s terms. That is, in this second basic produc-
tion complementarity “the returns to scale are created by the effects of other agents
outside an internal constant returns to scale production process [Cooper, 1999, 43].”
Demand for high-powered money interacts with this second production complementarity
to trigger general recession, and thereby generate a liquidity trap. The second gen-
eral production complementarity is both the propagation mechanism for recession,
and the source of a true liquidity trap. It is further worth noting that this liquidity trap
parable involves “liquidity” perhaps more nearly in a store of value sense of Tobin
[1958], than in a, perhaps more monetarist, sense of “liquidity services” per se.99 COORDINATION AND THE LIQUIDITY TRAP
effort. “Fragile” is taken to mean that the economy has both Pareto dominant and
secure equilibria, like this basic parable of decentralized production. The slightly more
complicated version of this basic parable, developed in this paper, is fragile as well.
The economic environment in this extended parable is still simple. There are two
production technologies in the model. There is a primitive production technology that
does not involve production complementarities, and an advanced production technol-
ogy that does. Recession is modeled as the general use of the primitive production
technology.
First consider the primitive, complementarity-free, production. This primitive pro-
duction technology is “Robinson Crusoe.” There are NJ individual producers endowed
with leisure, in the amount L each. These individuals have identical utility functions,
which are smooth, increasing and strictly quasi-concave, defined on leisure, C1, and a
single consumption commodity, C2. They can produce the consumption commodity, on
their own, and in isolation, with leisure. The rate of exchange of leisure for commod-
ity is a fixed 1:1. Assume for the moment that this is the only production technology
available. Then there is a unique optimal amount of input of leisure into this primitive
production technology, I*. That is, I* = argmaxIU(L   I, I), where U is the common
utility function. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2
Security is now found in foregoing efficient, advanced, specialized, joint produc-
tion, in favor of this primitive production; that is, in an inefficient, but secure (from
coordination failure) self-sufficiency. By using primitive production, in isolation, indi-
viduals can guarantee themselves a rate of return of one, at any production level.
Thus, the addition of primitive production, to the basic parable of production
complementarity, yields a more natural, appealing version of a secure equilibrium
than that of the “zero effort level” equilibrium. The general flight to this security is a
recession.
The advanced production technology has the two production complementarities.
The first production complementarity involves the use of multiple inputs. These inputs
take the form of component parts. The consumption commodity is produced from
leisure in a two stage process. First, component parts are produced with leisure, and
then, second, the component parts are assembled into the consumption commodity.
The NJ individuals endowed with leisure are also input producers. There are J in-
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preassigned to each input. Thus the input producers are specialized, which creates the
need for coordination. In the first stage of production, input producers produce their
preassigned input from leisure, at the fixed rate of exchange of 1:1. Their choice
variable is how much leisure to convert into input. Each can use either primitive or
advanced production, but not both.
In the second stage of advanced production, fabricators assemble the J inputs into
the consumption commodity. In addition to the NJ input producers, there are N fabri-
cators. These fabricators are identical, have no endowment, and consume only the
consumption commodity.  Each fabricator is capable of handling the input of just one
input producer of each of the J inputs. The input producers are also preassigned to
fabricators. Other than their preassignment to input and to fabricator, the input pro-
ducers are identical. Fabricators are zero cost. Their assembly of inputs yields
xJmin[I1,...,IJ] units of commodity from (I1,...,IJ) units of the J inputs. Hence, if a
fabricator has equal amounts of each input, then each unit of leisure ultimately yields
x units of commodity. If a fabricator has unequal amounts of inputs, output of com-
modity is determined by the least amount of any input, and any excess amounts of
inputs are just costlessly discarded as waste. Thus the rate of return x is achieved only
up to the minimum amount of any input, beyond that point individual inputs have a
rate of return of zero; hence the need for coordination. This second stage is the perfect
complements, component parts assembly, aspect of the advanced production technol-
ogy; where component parts come in infinitesimal increments. This advanced produc-
tion technology is just a goods version of the standard basic parable of production
complementarity. This basic production complementarity is discussed, for example,
by Cooper [1999, viii-xiii, 2-5, 41-46, 60], Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil [1990] and
Bryant [1983].
Fragility, as defined above, involves Pareto dominant and secure equilibria.  Primi-
tive production provides security, as there the rate of return of one is sure, in produc-
tion in isolation, without coordination. It remains to characterize the Pareto domi-
nant, advanced production, equilibrium, in this slightly more complicated version of
the basic parable of production complementarity. Assume that (almost) all of the rents
from the advanced production technology go to the fabricators, as only the fabricators
have the ability to assemble component parts.2 Specifically, suppose that the fabrica-
tor makes a take it or leave it offer to her input suppliers, an offer which is indifferent
to (or epsilon better than) their producing in the primitive production technology, on
their own. That is, fabricators ask their suppliers to supply a fixed amount of input for
a fixed amount of payout, amounts which yield the suppliers a utility of U(L   I*, I*).
If x ≥ 1, the fabricator’s problem is:
Max [xH   V]
H,V
subject to: U(L   H,V) ≥ U(L   I*, I*) ,
where H is the amount of each input produced, and the hours worked by each input
supplier, and V is the amount of consumption good paid to each input supplier by the
fabricator. Let the solution values be H = H* and V = V*. The fabricator’s problem
implies [U1(L   H*,V*)/U2(L   H*,V*)] = x and U(L   H*,V*) = U(L   I*,I*).  Thus the101 COORDINATION AND THE LIQUIDITY TRAP
fabricators are perfectly discriminating monopsonists.  Under the above assumptions
on tastes, there is for each value of x a unique optimal amount of input production,
I*(x), solving the above fabricator’s problem, I*(x) = H*.3  Moreover, for x ≥ 1, I*(x) is
a continuous increasing function of x, bounded below by I* and above by L. On the
other hand, if x < 1, only the primitive production technology is used. Notice also that,
for x > 1, there are Pareto dominant, advanced production, and secure, primitive
production, equilibria separately for the respective groups of input producers, preas-
signed to each fabricator.
This fabricator’s profit maximization problem is illustrated in Figure 3, where
C1 = L   H and C2 = V (compare with Figure 2).
FIGURE 3
Importantly, the advanced production technology also involves a second, general,
production complementarity. Recession is modeled as the general use of the primitive
production technology. Importantly, then, introduction of this second, general, pro-
duction complementarity motivates the general choice of the security of primitive
production, which characterizes recession, and generates a liquidity trap. This gen-
eral production complementarity is between the final product fabricators themselves.
Jointly the fabricators exhibit increasing returns. Specifically, the rate of return x is a
function, X, of the total amount of input successfully assembled by all of the fabrica-
tors. X is a known, continuous, positive, and strictly increasing function defined on
[0, NJL]. As usual, N is assumed to be large, and the value of X little affected by the
input assembled by a single fabricator. Consequently, the fabricators and input pro-
ducers ignore their own negligible effect upon x (and the use of a fixed x in the earlier
analysis remains valid). This is, then, exactly the second basic production
complementarity discussed by Cooper [1999, 41-43, 55-60], for example.
This general production complementarity motivates the general recession and
liquidity trap. It is assumed that, for small amounts of inputs assembled, x < 1. That
is, at low rates of aggregate production, the advanced technology yields a rate of
return less than the primitive technology. Specifically, X(JL) < 1. Thus a single fabri-
cator alone producing cannot compete with primitive production. This assumption
that X(JL) < 1 motivates the general recession and liquidity trap. It is further assumed
that for large amounts of input assembled x > 1, specifically X(NJI*) > 1.  That is, if all
input producers use the primitive production technology, they input leisure at a rate
that justifies using the advanced production technology instead (if they coordinate on
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doing so). This second assumption implies that there is at least one equilibrium rate of
input, in the advanced production technology, that yields a rate of return greater than
the primitive production technology.
Proposition 1: There is at least one equilibrium with a rate of return
greater than one.
Proof: By assumption X(NJI*(1)) = X(NJI*) > 1. Consider xm > X(NJL). Then X(NJI*(xm))
≤ X(NJL) < xm. Thus at x = 1 X(NJI*(x))   x > 0, and at x = xm X(NJI*(x))   x < 0. As the
function X(NJI*(x)) – x is continuous, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists
a rate of return xe, xm > xe > 1, such that X(NJI*(xe)) – xe = 0. (This proof is illustrated
in Figure 4.)
FIGURE 4
Thus, with one or more equilibria, in advanced production, with a rate of return
greater than one, the equilibrium with the highest rate of return is the Pareto domi-
nant equilibrium.4
RECESSION
Recession is modeled as the general use of the primitive production technology.
There are Pareto dominant, advanced production, and secure, primitive production,
equilibria separately for the respective groups of input producers, preassigned to each
fabricator. Thus a recession could be the result of the general choice of primitive
production by the separate groups of input producers. This general choice can simply
be interpreted as being the result of waves of animal spirits, self-fulfilling prophecies
or sunspots [Romer, 1996, 296]. However, in addition, the second general production
technology provides a propagation mechanism for recession. That is, because of the
general production complementarity, separate coordination failures have spillover
effects.
This propagation mechanism for recession is a simple one. Given the general
production complementarity, even limited input coordination failure triggers reces-
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with the general production complementarity, triggers general use of the primitive
production technology. Refer to fabricators, whose respective group of suppliers, sepa-
rately, choose security as “disrupted fabricators,” and to the others as “undisrupted
fabricators.” Indeed, suppose that the number of disrupted fabricators is known before
undisrupted fabricators coordinate input suppliers. Say that N1 < N fabricators are
undisrupted and can coordinate inputs. If N1 is sufficiently small, there is general
recession. Indeed, the proof of Proposition 1 has an immediate corollary.
Corollary 1: If N1 satisfies X(N1JI*(x))   x <  0, for all x ≥ 1, then there
is no equilibrium in which N1 fabricators produce.
As X is increasing, there also is no equilibrium in which fewer than N1 fabricators
produce. A simple sufficient condition for the condition in Corollary 1, namely that
X(N1JI*(x))   x < 0, for all x1 ≥ 1, is that X(N1JL) < 1 (which already holds by assump-
tion for N1 = 1). Summarizing, then, if (N   N1) disrupted fabricators cannot produce,
because their inputs cannot be coordinated, then the rate of return in the advanced
production technology, x, is less than one, even if all the remaining fabricators pro-
duce. The fabricators all realize this, none produce, and there is general recession.
Limited input coordination failure has triggered general recession.
Corollary 1 exhibits a direct relation between technological productivity and reces-
sion. An economy with a less productive advanced technology, a sufficiently lower rate
of return function X, has a lower “trigger point,” (N   N1), for recession. This further
suggests that an economy hit by a negative technology shock would also be a prime
candidate for a coordination failure induced recession.
EXTENSIONS OF THE SIMPLE PARABLE: HIGH-POWERED MONEY AND
RECESSION
The above parable can be interpreted as a very simple model of money. It is
assumed above that fabricators provide their suppliers with a payout in the consump-
tion commodity. However, the advanced production technology involves a two stage
process. Input is produced in the first stage of production, while the commodity is not
fabricated until the second stage. This two stage production process, then, immedi-
ately induces a demand for claims of some sort with which fabricators can pay suppli-
ers. While the structure of this coordination parable is simple, consideration of such
claims may, nonetheless, provide insight into the demand for money, and, in particu-
lar, into a coordination-based demand for high-powered money by disrupted fabrica-
tors. In the first instance, suppose that the undisrupted fabricators are simply paying
suppliers, in the first stage, in promises to consumption commodity in the second
stage; promises which might be viewed as a rudimentary “inside money,” that is,
claims backed by promises of future payment.  However, under this money interpre-
tation of the parable, disrupted fabricators are those whose promises of consumption
commodity are worthless. That is, unfortunately, inside money, a fabricator’s promise
to consumption commodity, is worthless to a supplier, if the fabricator’s other suppli-
ers do not accept it as well. The fabricator cannot meet her promises of consumption
commodity without getting all of the inputs. Thus primitive production is indeed secure,104 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
it maximizes the supplier’s payoff given that that supplier believes that the fabricator’s
other suppliers also will not accept the inside money. Suppliers of disrupted fabrica-
tors want security, which inside money does not provide. This raises the question of
whether, with another form of claim available, disrupted fabricators could still pro-
duce. Indeed, high-powered money can serve this function. That is, suppliers, seeking
security, would accept payment, up front, in a high-powered money, if available.
To allow for a simple form of high-powered money, gold is introduced to the par-
able. Following McAndrews and Roberds [1999], “gold” is treated as already existing
consumption commodity. Parenthetically, if, instead, one modeled a fiat high-powered
money, then it would be necessary to consider the possibility of the inside monies, the
fabricators’ promises to consumption commodity, themselves becoming fiat. That is,
fiat money models, with multiple types of paper available, have multiple equilibria,
with the various papers serving as “monies.”5 While doubtless of theoretical interest,
this feature of fiat money models does not seem to be of great practical interest. In
any case, this, conceivably interesting, but tangential, issue is avoided by simply assum-
ing a “gold” high-powered money, which is consumption commodity.
Disrupted fabricators can use high-powered money to coordinate inputs. Indeed,
by paying in currency, “cash on the barrel head,” a disrupted fabricator insures input
production. This coordination-based demand for a high-powered money is a simple
notion. Assume fabricators are now endowed with gold. Further, disrupted fabricators
pay their input suppliers with notes, 100 percent backed by that gold. Input suppliers,
paid in such high-powered notes, do not have to concern themselves with the behavior
of the other input suppliers. They are paid in full in any case, as they can simply
consume the backing gold directly. Indeed, then, these high-powered notes provide
the desired security. Hence input producers, paid in such high-powered money, do,
indeed, produce input. In short, high-powered money facilitates coordination.
Naturally, if there is a large enough number of disrupted fabricators, and small
enough endowments of gold, general recession still results.6 Hence high demand for
high-powered money triggers general recession.
EXTENSIONS OF THE SIMPLE PARABLE: LIQUIDITY TRAP AND
DEPRESSION
One might even speculate that this simple parable provides insight into the Great
Depression. In particular, the model exhibits a liquidity trap.
There is a view that during the Great Depression the economy was awash in
liquidity, hence the notion of the liquidity trap. With the interpretation of this par-
able, as described above, this may actually have been more of a high-powered money
trap, than a “liquidity trap,” per se, at all. With a large number of disrupted fabrica-
tors, their demand for high-powered money is high, up until the point of general
recession. However, in the general recession, fabricators are not producing at all, and
are not using high-powered money. That is, if enough disrupted fabricators cannot
produce, because they do not have access to high-powered money, then it is not effi-
cient for any fabricators to produce, and there is general recession, with no fabricator
demand for high-powered money. Thus a high-powered money shortage triggers gen-
eral recession, resulting, in turn, in a high-powered money glut. Hence the, seemingly105 COORDINATION AND THE LIQUIDITY TRAP
paradoxical, twin perils of high-powered money shortage and high-powered money
glut are reconciled.
The consistency with the liquidity trap goes deeper, however. The general produc-
tion complementarity may generate a true liquidity trap. While triggered by a short-
age of high-powered money, a general recession might take on a life of its own. Imag-
ine, in a repeated version of the parable, that, first, a general recession is triggered by
high demand for high-powered money. Because of this experience of recession, fabri-
cators and input producers might then subsequently become “focused” on the secure
equilibrium. That is, with them all now anticipating a low rate of return, a low x,
advanced production is unattractive relative to primitive production. With no fabrica-
tors using advanced production, its rate of return x, indeed, is low. That is, given the
general production complementarity, the low rate of return is now self-fulfilling proph-
esy. A general recession, initially triggered by demand for high-powered money, is
sustained on its own momentum, as pessimism now pervades the economy.
This possibility is particularly intriguing. There is now a true high-powered money
trap. Once fabricators and input producers are all focused on the secure equilibrium,
introducing more gold does not move the economy out of recession. The problem now
is not an inadequate supply of high-powered money, but the general pessimism, the
general anticipation of bad times. A fabricator, even if offering payment in high-
powered money, still only anticipates an unacceptable rate of return of x < 1. Conse-
quently, at this point, enhancements in high-powered money supply are, indeed, a
matter of “pushing on a string.” Not only is the economy awash in high-powered
money, there is a true high-powered money trap. Now no amount of additional high-
powered money helps.
In this liquidity trap parable, at least, the critical attribute of high-powered money
is its assured store of value. That is, quite purposefully, in this parable, the high-
powered notes are not assumed to have any advantage, over inside money, in terms of
portability, divisibility, recognizability, validation, or legal or recording costs; matters
involving “liquidity services.” Indeed, the high-powered notes do not have any advan-
tage in terms of information or uncertainty either, at least in equilibrium. In the
Pareto dominant equilibrium the respective inside money is known to be of value,
while in the secure equilibrium it is known to be valueless. It is, rather, just this
valuelessness of inside money, in the secure equilibrium, itself, which is the problem.
If you will, the high-powered money is acting as an assured store of value. So, with
this interpretation, and for this purpose, it is its assured store of value, not “liquidity
services” per se, which is the crucial attribute of high-powered money. This is, then,
perhaps, closer to Tobin’s [1958] approach to liquidity preference, than to a, perhaps
more monetarist, “liquidity services” interpretation. Moreover, note that, perhaps,
indeed, this “Tobinesque” interpretation of liquidity trap should not be rejected out of
hand. Indeed, suppose one takes the apocryphal Great Depression stories of currency
buried, in tin cans, in the back yard, seriously. It is not at all clear that “liquidity
services,” per se, are the attraction of a buried currency!
In short, the Great Depression may have had a monetary trigger, but a real source
of persistence.106 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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1. The literature treats both continuous and discrete versions [Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil, 1990;
Romer 1996, 294-299; Cooper, 1999, viii-xiii, 2-5, 41-46, 60], where this is variously referred to as the
“min rule,” the “stag hunt” and “Bryant’s game.”
2. The particular allocation of rents is not crucial, but this allocation of the rents to the fabricators
facilitates discussion.
3. Hence I*(1) = I*.
4. As analyzed by Cooper [1999, 19-25], there may be multiple equilibria in the advanced production
technology.  Note also that this Pareto dominant equilibrium is not Pareto optimal, as it is in the
standard basic parable of production complementarity itself.
5. One would further have to address the fact that the holding of a truly pure fiat money, itself, is not
secure (albeit involving a less “risky” game [Cooper, 1999] than the min rule).
6. Indeed, this simple structure can induce a rudimentary fractional reserve system, in which, in effect,
undisrupted fabricators provide their gold backed notes to disrupted fabricators.  Even with this
sharing of high-powered money, if aggregate gold supply is small enough, general recession
remains possible.
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